Book Review: ‘Back From The Brink- 1,000 Days At Number 11’- Alistair Darling

These memoirs were published in a hurry: extracts appeared in September 2011, less than eighteen months after Darling left Government. I’m tempted to speculate why. Did Darling want to get his contribution out of the way before taking charge of the Better Together campaign; was he pressurised by his publisher; or did he strike while the iron was hot in order to preserve his reputation? 

 

What is clear is that Darling and Brown did not see eye-to-eye. The Prime Minister felt that the Chancellor’s economic forecasts were unreasonably gloomy. For his part, Darling admits he was cautious, but then again he had access to all the data. Brown’s ‘investment verses cuts’ strategy, the author argues, missed the point: public spending had to be addressed. 

Darling characterises himself as an arch pragmatist prepared to tell truth to power, only for power to ignore the advice. Given the circumstances, the stakes, Darling feels that he dealt with the financial crisis rather well. Going further, he expresses his frustration that No 10 failed to capitalise on his astute economic fire-fighting. 

Of course there’s more to politics than assigning blame. There’s also credit to accrue. “In the aftermath of the crisis” begins my favourite passage from Back from the Brink, “there have been many who have claimed authorship of what proved to be a highly successful plan ... [but] it really doesn’t matter who thought of the scheme first. What matters is that it worked. What I know for certain is that the Treasury, the Bank and the FSA started work on 26 September, under my instruction.”

Brilliant stuff. Indeed, while the tone is hardly triumphant (the cover jacket is almost comically austere) Darling is primarily concerned with vindicating his chancellorship, a feat he almost pulls off.

Putting politics to one side, it would be folly to deny the fact that Darling- a competent, cautious, experienced Minister- handled the financial crisis in a calm, logical matter. Of course, this is the impression he wishes to give, but it would be churlish to deny credit where credit is due. (Pun almost intended).

That said, the book is light on detail. In part this will be because copious amounts of economic data would contravene two important rules: it would reveal too much about policies still in practise, and it would be mind numbingly boring. So instead Darling dwells on the characters he dealt with: there’s a late night meeting with Fred Goodwin, disagreements with Mervyn King. Interesting, but superficial. Anyone keen to understand the mechanics behind the Government’s decision making should head elsewhere. 

Understandably, when first released the ruptures in the Brown-Darling relationship caught the eye. But these passages, intended to be climatic, fall a little flat. He dutifully knifes Brown on his management style, on policy, but he does so with little relish.

Yet their policy disagreements were substantive. Brown’s adherence to the ‘investment versus cuts’ line and Darling’s insistence on the need for budgetary rigor hinted at something larger, namely the tension between a Keynesian response to the crisis and New Labour’s mantra of economic prudence. This debate has yet to be fully resolved, but Darling will have keenly noted the words of Ed Balls last week and probably afforded himself the faintest of smiles.